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NEW YORK CITY ZONING RESOLUTION
SECTION 12-10: A THIRD PHASE IN
THE EVOLUTION OF AIRSPACE LAW
I. Introduction
New York City Zoning Resolution section 12-10' limits the build-
able floorspace that a structure may have 2 and expresses this limita-
tion in floor area ratios. 3 Through a zoning lot merger, the floor area
ratios of two or more zoning lots may be combined, 4 thereby permit-
ting a constructive physical transfer of airspace5 from one city lot6 to
another. Using section 12-10 as a reference point, this Note will
1. New York City Zoning Resolution art. 1, ch. 2, § 12-10 (1977) (amending
New York City Zoning Resolution art. 1, ch. 2, § 12-10 (1961)) [hereinafter cited as
amended § 12-10].
2. Newport Assocs. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 265, 283 N.E.2d 600, 601, 332
N.Y.S.2d 617, 618 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
3. Id. Floor area ratio (FAR) is the total floor area on a zoning lot, divided by
the " lot area" of a zoning lot. Amended § 12-10, supra note 1, at 34. Thus, a
building containing 20,000 square feet of floor area on a zoning lot of 10,000 square
feet has a floor area ratio of 2.0. See id. "Lot area" is the area of a zoning lot. Id.
4. NewportAssocs., 30 N.Y.2d at 265, 283 N.E.2d at 601, 332 N.Y.S. at 618-19.
The floor area ratio technique was incorporated into the zoning ordinance for low
density residential districts of New York City as early as 1940, but was not extended
to the city's commercial districts until 1961. Note, Development Rights Transfers in
New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338, 346 (1972). Simply put, a ratio is assigned to each
district. If the ratio is five in a certain district then on a lot of 10,000 square feet a
builder could only erect a structure containing 50,000 square feet of floorspace.
Multiplying the ratio by the area of a particular lot yields the maximum permissable
floorspace. Id. As a zoning tool, FAR prevents a builder from lowering the ceiling
heights and sandwiching extra floors within the height limit in an attempt to circum-
vent the city's plan for density control. Marcus, Air Rights Transfer in New York
City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 372, 373 & n.1 (1970).
5. Airspace has been described as the space extending from the surface of the
earth upward which either is occupied or utilized or is reasonably subject thereto or is
otherwise required for the use and enjoyment of the surface land by the surface
owners. Model Airspace Act § 2, reprinted in Wright, The Model Airspace Act; Old
and New Law for Contemporary Land Use Problems, 1972 LAW & Soc. OiwEI 529,
554 (1972). Airspace, then, is that space extending vertically upward from the
surface boundaries of the landowner. Id. As in the Model Airspace Act, the use of
"airspace" in this Note will not refer to the upper reaches of space occupied by
aircraft. Id.
6. When applied to property in a city, a " lot" usually refers to that property
which is bounded and described by the plat or survey of the city. Lehmann v. Revell,
354 Ill. 262, 277, 188 N.E. 531, 537 (1933); Greendale v. Suit, 163 Ind. 282, 284, 71
N.E. 658, 659 (1904); Adams v. Central City Brick & Block Co., 154 Mich. 448, 455,
117 N.W. 932, 935 (1908); Mawson-Peterson Lumber Co. v. Sprinkle, 59 Wyo. 334,
343, 140 P.2d 588, 591 (1943).
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analyze the three major phases in the legal evolution of airspace. In its
initial phase, airspace was considered to be a form of land inseparable
from the soil owned by the surface landowner.7 Subsequently, the law
permitted airspace to be severed from the soil, enabling the surface
landowner to alienate the airspace while retaining title to the soil. 8
However, the alienated airspace retained its physical location in
space. The final phase, permitting the constructive transfer of air-
space from one lot to another under the amended section 12-10,9 will
be analyzed in light of the New York Court of Appeals' recent decision
in MacMillan, Inc. v. CF Lex Associates.10
The current section 12-10 requires the approval of certain "parties
in interest" under section 12-10(d)(iv) before an airspace transfer can
occur between two tracts of land with different owners.II After a brief
discussion of possible candidates within the category "parties in inter-
est" under section 12-10(d)(iv), 12 this Note concludes with an evalua-
tion of the amended section 12-10 as a provision which (1) modern-
7. Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 491, 79 N.E. 716, 718 (1906).
8. R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 224-26 (1968); see note 42 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of state statutes permitting the severance of
airspace from the surface land.
9. Amended § 12-10, supra note 1, at 60.
10. MacMillan v. CF Lex Assocs., 56 N.Y.2d 386, 437 N.E.2d 1134, 452
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1982).
11. MacMillan, Inc. v. Cadillac Fairview Corp., 86 A.D.2d 15, 18, 448
N.Y.S.2d 668, 670 (1st Dep't), rev'd sub nom. MacMillan, Inc. v. CF Lex Assocs., 56
N.Y.2d 386, 437 N.E.2d 1134, 452 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1982).
12. Under the resolution a " party in interest" to the tract of land involved in the
transaction gives such permission by executing and recording a written " declaration
of restrictions." Amended § 12-10, supra note 1, at 60-61 (d). The resolution
provides that:
(iv) A "party in interest" in the portion of the tract of land covered by a
Declaration shall include only (W) the fee owner or owners thereof, (X)
the holder of any enforceable recorded interest in all or part thereof which
would be superior to the Declaration and which could result in such
holder obtaining possession of any portion of such tract of land, (Y) the
holder of any enforceable recorded interest in all or part thereof which
would be adversely affected by the Declaration, and (Z) the holder of any
unrecorded interest in all or part thereof which would be superior to and
adversely affected by the Declaration and which would be disclosed by a
physical inspection of the portion of the tract of land covered by the
Declaration.
Id. The resolution also provides that when a zoning lot is comprised of two or more
lots contiguous for a minimum of ten feet that are under single fee ownership, each
party having an interest therein is a "party in interest." Amended § 12-10, supra note
1, at 60 (c). For the purposes of that subdivision:
(ii) A "party in interest" in the tract of land shall include only (W) the fee
owner thereof, (X) the holder of any enforceable recorded interest superior
to that of the fee owner and which could result in such holder obtaining
possession of all or substantially all of such tract of land, (Y) the holder of
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izes our stationary concept of real property 3 and (2) establishes
airspace property interests as being necessarily linked to the equiva-
lent property interest in the land below.
II. Zoning Resolution Section 12-10
In adopting section 12-10 the New York City Planning Commission
(the Commission)14 has altered the traditional description of a city
lot. 5 Like a traditional lot, a zoning lot can be a lot of record.' 6 A
zoning lot, however, "can also be a tract of land consisting of two or
more" lots of record located within a single block.' 7 When such con-
tiguous lots are treated as one zoning lot, a "zoning lot merger"
occurs.' 8 The ability to perform a zoning lot merger profoundly af-
fects the commercial development of the lot. '
any enforceable recorded interest in all or substantially all of such tract of
land which would be adversely affected by the development thereof and
(Z) the holder of any unrecorded interest in all or substantially all of such
tract of land which would be superior to and adversely affected by the
development thereof and which would be disclosed by a physical inspec-,
tion of the tract of land.
Id. For a brief discussion of "parties in interest" under I (c), see note 94 infra and
accompanying text.
13. In the common law the location of land is emphasized. Marcus, Mandatory
Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's
Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77, 88 (1975). Its location or position in space
has been seen as its very essence. Id. at 103. Blackstone defined land as that which is
fixed, permanent, and immovable, which cannot be carried out of its place. See 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 219 (G. Chase ed. 1878).
14. See New York City Charter § 200 (1976 & Supp. 1982-83) (confers the
Commission with zoning power).
15. The term " lot" when applied to a city usually refers to that property which is
bounded and described by the plat or survey of the city. See note 6 supra and
accompanying text for a discussion of" city lot." Under both the original § 12-10 and
the amended § 12-10 a zoning lot need not coincide with a lot as represented by a
recorded plat. Amended § 12-10, supra note 1, at 60.
16. The amended § 12-10 specifically states that the lot of record should exist on
the effective date of the resolution or any applicable amendment thereto. Amended §
12-10, supra note 1, at 60 (a).
17. To comprise a zoning lot under the resolution the two or more tracts of land
must (1) be in single ownership on the effective date of either the resolution or any
applicable subsequent amendment thereto, id. (b), or (2) be contiguous for a
minimum of ten linear feet, be located within a single block, and, at the time of filing
for a building permit or a certificate of occupancy be under single fee ownership, id.
(c), or (3) be contiguous for a minimum of ten linear feet and be declared at the
time a building permit is required or at the time of filing for a certificate of
occupancy to be a tract of land to be treated as one zoning lot. Id. (d).
18. City Planning Commission Document # n 760226 ZRY, 1, July 13, 1977/ Cal.
# 27, Amendment of the Zoning Resolution [hereinafter cited as "CPC" Doc.].
19. In one particular case, a zoning lot merger would enable a developer to erect
a structure containing 1,006,000 square feet of space. Without the merger, the
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New York City Zoning Resolution section 12-10 also limits the
buildable floorspace that a structure may have.20 These limitations are
expressed in floor area ratios. 2' A zoning lot merger permits the floor
area ratio of two or more contiguous lots to be combined. 22 Thus,
where an existing building on one of the contiguous lots does not
completely utilize the floor area ratio for that building, a zoning lot
merger permits the developer of the contiguous lot to incorporate the
unused airspace when computing the maximum floorspace for any
building he proposes to construct on that lot. 23 An example illustrates
the point. If a particular lot is 10,000 square feet with a floor area
ratio of ten, then a developer may erect a building containing 100,000
square feet. Suppose, however, that the developer erects a building
utilizing only 50,000 square feet. If he "merges" this lot with a contig-
uous lot with the same square footage and floor area ratio, then the
developer of the contiguous lot may erect a building of 150,000 square
feet, utilizing both the square footage alloted to it under its own floor
area ratio (100,000 square feet) and the unused square footage from
the first lot (50,000 square feet). This shift of allocated floorspace
constitutes a constructive physical transfer of the unused airspace
from one lot to another. 24 The transfer is effective as long as the
building which is the recipient of the transfer remains standing.25
III. The Development of Airspace Law
A. The First Phase: Butler and Early Airspace Ownership
Resolution section 12-10 involves the doctrine of air rights.26 The
doctrine of air rights has its origin in Roman law.27 In the sixteenth
builder would have been entitled to erect a building containing only 914,000 square
feet, a 10% reduction in space. MacMillan, Inc. v. Cadillac Fairview Corp., 86
A.D.2d 15, 17, 448 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669 (lstDep't), rev'd sub nom. MacMillan, Inc. v.
CF Lex Assocs., 56 N.Y.2d 286, 437 N.E.2d 1134, 452 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1982).
20. See note 2 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of buildable floor-
space.
21. See note 3 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of floor area ratios.
22. See note 4 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of floor area ratio
combination.
23. Newport Asocs., 30 N.Y.2d at 265, 283 N.E.2d at 601, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 618-
19.
24. The Department of City Planning has illustrated the spatial transfer in a
draft report. See City of New York Dep't of City Planning, Midtown Development
Project Draft Report 52 (1980) (illustration of zoning lot merger).
25. CPC Doc., supra note 18, at 2.
26. "Air rights" are a property interest in a three dimensional location in space.
Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Land-
marks, 85 HARv. L. REv. 574, 592 n.58 (1972). They have also been described as a
1042 [Vol. XI
AIRSPACE LAW
century, the doctrine was incorporated into the English common
law 28 where it was a source of controversy and confusion. It was
subsequently adopted in America.2 ' Four hundred years later, in
"unit of real property created through the horizontal subdivision of real estate...
the right to occupy the space ... over ... a designated tract of land." Comment,
Conveyance and Taxation of Air Rights, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1964). The term
"air rights" has been frequently used in a discussion or delineation of property rights
in airspace. Wright, supra note 5, at 530. The courts have adopted this term when
referring to a § 12-10 transfer. MacMillan, Inc. v. CF Lex Assocs., 56 N.Y.2d 386,
390, 437 N.E.2d 1134, 1136, 452 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (1982); Newport Assocs., 30
N.Y.2d at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 603, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 621, (Breitel J., concurring); Pith
Equities, Inc. v. New York Theological Seminary, 39 A.D.2d 890, 891, 333 N.Y.S.2d
970, 971 (1st Dep't 1972); Fur-Lex Realty v. Lindsay, 81 Misc. 2d 904, 906, 367
N.Y.S.2d 388, 391 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
27. The popular theory is that we derive our concept of airspace ownership from
the Roman law. See Klein, Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est . .. Quousque Tandem?, 26 J.
OF AIR L. & CoM. 237, 240 (1959); Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim " cuius est
solum"in International Air Law, 1 McGILL L.J. 23, 27-28 (1952). There is consider-
able disagreement among the scholars regarding the extent of the Roman landowner's
claim over the airspace above his land. See, Klein, supra, at 239-40. One writer
believes that Roman law gave the landowner control of the air column above his
property limited to low altitudes such as the height of buildings and trees. Id. Yet the
same writer believes that the spirit of the law would extend the control to any
altitude. Id. Another writer illustrates that while some scholars believe the Roman
law to impart an exclusive right tantamount to ownership, others believe that the
Roman landowner did not in any way own the airspace above his land. Cooper,
supra, at 27, 28.
28. The concept of airspace ownership first reached common law in the form of a
maxim, appended to a sixteenth century case. Bury v. Pope, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (1587).
The applicable part of the maxim reads "cujus est solum, ejus est . .. usque ad
coelum . . .," id., which means "[h]e who has the soil has everything up to the sky."
R. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 16. Baten's Case helped to further establish the principle
in the maxim by incorporating it into its opinion. Baten's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 810,
811-13 (1610) (nuisance would lie when rainwater fell from defendant's overhanging
roof onto the roof of plaintiff). However, the doctrine received a severe setback two
centuries later. Pickering v. Rudd, 171 Eng. Rep. 400, 401 (1815) (when the board
nailed to one's house invades the airspace above the land of another, no trespass
occurs). The doctrine of the maxim was resuscitated shortly thereafter. Corbett v.
Hill, 22 L.T.R. (n.s.) 263, 264 (1870) (the owner of the soil owns the column of air
above the soil as well). Nevertheless, there is still disagreement in England as to
whether or not a surface owner actually owns the airspace above his land or merely
possesses rights to use that airspace. R. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 29-30.
29. The doctrine received a more consistent reception in America than it had in
England. Kent adopted the principle wholeheartedly, asserting that land "has an
indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards .. " 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAw 509 (11th ed. 1867). Cf. Lyman v. Hale, 11 Conn. 177, 184
(1836) (recognizing that branches overhanging another's land would constitute a
nuisance since land comprehends everything in a direct line over it); Hannabalson v.
Sessions, 116 Iowa 457, 90 N.W. 93 (1902) (trespass comitted by stretching arm
across a boundary); Smith v. Smith, 110 Mass. 302, 303-04 (1872) (barn eaves which
project over another's land constitute a trespass). The integration of the maxim's
concept did not vary substantially from state to state. See R. WRICGHT, supra note 8,
at 38.
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1906, the doctrine was adopted in New York in Butler v. Frontier
Telephone Co. 30 In that case, the New York Court of Appeals un-
equivocally asserted that " space above land is real estate the same as
the land itself." 31 It further emphasized that airspace as land is insepa-
rable from the soil. 32 The court concluded, moreover, that the owner
of the surface land is the owner of the airspace above it and that he
enjoys the right to the exclusive possession of the airspace as a part of
his land.33
In United States v. Causby,3 4 the United States Supreme Court
determined that airplane flights over private land constituted a taking
of property in violation of the fifth amendment3 5 if they interfered
30. 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906) (action of ejectment will lie where the soil
is not touched, but part of the space a few feet above the soil is occupied by a
telephone wire unlawfully strung by defendant over plaintiff's premises).
31. Id. at 491, 79 N.E. at 718.
32. Id.
33. Id. While the court suggested that the upward exent of this ownership was
not limitless, it noted that there was no limitation within the bounds of any structure
that had been erected by man. Id. Nebraska followed Butler by declaring that
ejectment would be the proper remedy where the eaves of a house projected over
plaintiff's land. Otherwise the encroachment would ripen into adverse possession.
McDivitt v. Bronson, 101 Neb. 437, 438, 163 N.W. 761, 762 (1917). However,
McDivitt did not repeat the Butler declaration, 186 N.Y. at 891, 79 N.E. at 718, that
airspace is real property the same as surface land itself.
In other jurisdictions intrusions into the airspace of a landowner did not warrant
an action for ejectment. See Norwalk Heating & Lighting Co. v. Vernam, 75 Conn.
662, 55 A. 168 (1903) (the projection of a structure over the land of another which
does not touch the land is not an ouster of possession); Beck v. Ashland Cigar &
Tobacco Co., 146 Wisc. 324, 130 N.W. 464 (1911) (where landowner is undisturbed
in the possession of his land, remedy for encroachment is in trespass and not in
ejectment). Ejectment will not lie for anything upon which entry cannot be made or
of which the sheriff cannot deliver execution. Village of Lee v. Harris, 206 Ill. 428,
434, 69 N.E. 230, 231-32 (1903); Hancock v. Mac Avoy, 151 Pa. 469, 461, 25 A. 47,
48 (1892). Wright suggests that the failure of the courts to grant ejectment when
airspace was intruded upon stemmed from the belief that airspace is incapable of
possession. R. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 53. One authority strenuously took this
position at the time. Comment, Insurance Policies-Implied Waiver of Conditions, 16
YALE L.J. 273, 276 (1906-07). The significance of Butler is that it departed from this
line of thinking. The decision was never modified.
34. 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (flights of air craft over private land which are so low
and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and
use of the land are as much an appropriation of the use of the land as more
conventional entry upon it and thus constitute a violation of the fifth amendment).
35. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "nor shall
any person . . . be deprived of . . . property without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. A "taking" of property refers to the government's power of eminent
domain. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 437 (1978). The
United States may "take" property pursuant to its power of eminent domain either by
inverse condemnation or by instituting condemnation proceedings. Best v. Humboldt
AIRSPACE LAW
with the landowner's use and enjoyment of the surface land. 3 Subse-
quently, in Griggs v. Allegheny County,37 the Court declared that a
taking could occur even if flights passed over space which Congress
had defined as navigable. 3 These decisions are significant because
they establish that even our highest court recognizes airspace owner-
ship, which is at the heart of the Butler decision. 3
B. The Second Phase: Severance of Aerial Land from Terrestrial
Land
Contemporaneously with Butler's declaration that airspace is a
form of land inseparable from the soil, airspace in New York was
Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 340 (1963). The power of eminent domain extends
to all territories within the United States, including the District of Columbia. Shoe-
maker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298-99 (1893). The government may appropri-
ate any private property if it pays a just compensation, Long Island Water Supply
Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 689 (1897), including tidelands, United States v.
Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472, 487-89 (1921); Indian lands, Cherokee Nation v.
Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 656-57 (1890); trust property; United States v.
Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 239 (1946), reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 834 (1947); and con-
tracts, Long Island Water Supply Co., 166 U.S. at 690.
It is the deprivation to the former owner rather than the gain to the government
which constitutes a "taking." United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
378 (1945). A "taking" occurs when the effects of the governmental action are so
complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the property. Id.
The prohibition against the "taking" of private property for the public use without
just compensation applies against the states through the fourteenth amendment. San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1981); Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980). The fourteenth amendment
reads "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
36. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946). The Court realized that if
a landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land he must have exclusive control of
the immediate reaches above it. Id. Justice Douglas made clear that the limitations
imposed upon the airspace ownership were accomodations to aviation and the need
for efficient air travel, a matter clearly within the public interest which can neither
be interfered with nor subject to unreasonable private claim. Id. at 261.
37. 369 U.S 84 (1962).
38. Congress had defined "navigable airspace," see 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26) (1976),
to include airspace needed to insure safe landings and takeoffs. At no time did any
flights go below the navigable airspace levels. See Griggs, 369 U.S. at 86-89. Justice
Douglas was again called upon to write the opinion of the Court. He reiterated that
the use of land presupposes the use of some airspace as well. Id. at 89.
39. The Causby Court indicated the compatability between its holding and the
holding in Butler in support of the proposition that intrusions which limit the
landowner's exploitation of the airspace above his land constitute a "taking." 328
U.S. at 265 & n. 10. Notwithstanding the aviation cases a landowner should enjoy full
rights to the airspace. Wright, supra note 5, at 539. This attitude has been reflected
in several state statutes. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-03-3 (1975) (landowner owns
airspace above his land except for that needed for airflight); S.D. LAWs ANN. § 50-
13-3 (1967) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 42-1-103 (1980) (same).
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being horizontally separated from the surface land, permitting it to be
sold or leased apart from the surface land. 40 Since then many land-
owners have sold or leased the airspace above their land. 41 Moreover,
states have enacted statutes covering such conveyances. 42 Recently,
40. For a general discussion of the events which gave rise to the severance of
airspace from the land beneath it, see R. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 223-37 (discussing
the leasing of airspace above railroads at the turn of the century). At that time,
Grand Central Station was in great need of an expanded facility to accomodate its
ever-increasing traffic of trains. Id. at 224. An arrangement was entered into
wherein the airspace above a certain level of the ground was leased to developers.
Beneath that airspace the railroad was able to construct an expanded two-level
terminal yard. By the time the new station opened, buildings had already been
erected in the airspace above it. Id. at 224-25 (quoting Schmidt, Public Utility Air
Rights, 54 A.B.A. REP. 839, 841 (1929)). The transaction did not result in litigation
on the subject of air rights. R. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 225. A railroad case arose
later, however, which readily accepted a lease of airspace. Phoenix Ins. Co. of
Hartford v. New York & Harlem R.R. Co., 59 F.2d 962, 964 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 645 (1932) (railroad has the power to lease supersurface space not needed
for railroad purposes as long as it does not interfere with or cause injury to the estate
in reversion). Similar leasing arrangements occurred in Chicago in the late 1920's. R.
WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 229. In 1927 Illinois passed a statute which permits a
railroad, union depot or terminal company to sell or lease the airspace above the
ground upon the approval of the Illinois Commerce Commission. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 114, § 174a (1954 & Supp. 1981). The Illinois court permits railroads to show the
use to which such portion of its airspace could have been put but for condemnation
under eminent domain. City of Chicago v. Sexton, 408 Ill. 351, 357, 97 N.E.2d 287,
290 (1951).
41. Today many of Manhattan's buildings are built in airspace. See R. WRUGHT,
supra note 8, at 261-63. While appearing to rest on the earth's surface, they actually
terminate at a point above the ground and are supported by hidden piers and
columns. Wright, supra note 5, at 540-41. Other cities (e.g., Chicago, Washington,
D.C., Los Angeles, Detroit, Milwaukee, New Orleans, Dallas, Houston, Philadel-
phia, Cleveland) have joined New York in recognizing and permitting the convey-
ance of airspace apart from the land. R. WRUGHT, supra note 8, at 263-67.
42. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-137 (1981) (airspace over state highways,
county roads, streets of cities or towns may be leased to owners of private properties);
CAL. STS. & Hy. CODE § 104.12 (West Supp. 1982) (permitting the Department of
Public Works to lease areas above or below state highways for any term not to exceed
99 years subject to such restrictions as the department deems necessary and to deposit
the revenue from such leases in the State Highway Account); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-
32-101 (1982) (providing for the creation of estates, rights, and interests in areas
above the surface of the ground in persons or corporations other than the owners of
the land); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-290d (West 1977) (permitting a municipal-
ity, with the approval of the state board of education, to convey an interest in the
airspace over land used for school purposes to a private developer for residential or
non-residential use or to a public non-municipal or quasi-municipal corporation); id.
§ 12-64 (West 1972 & Supp. 1972-1981) (leased airspace may be assessed and taxed
apart from the land); id. § 13a-80a (West Supp. 1982) (allowing the commissioner of
transportation to sell, lease, or convey any interest the state may have in the airspace
above or below a state highway); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-6-117 (1982) (air rights over
proposed and existing limited access highways may be leased for development); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.381 (West 1965 & Supp. 1983) (granting the issuance of
permits for the construction of buildings over highways); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40, §
1046 [Vol. XI
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the Oklahoma legislature, in enacting the Oklahoma Airspace Act,
43
has declared that airspace is real property. Under the Act all rules
governing real property are applicable to airspace. 44 However, despite
extension of the Butler doctrine that airspace was a form of land
22E (Law. Co-op. 1973) (allowing the leasing of airspace above municipal structures
and facilities other than parks, playgrounds, and land held for conservation pur-
poses, providing such airspace is taxed to the lessee); id. ch. 168, § 35 (Law. Co-op.
1977 & Supp. 1982) (permitting savings banks to make or acquire first mortgage
loans on the leasehold interests in air rights over land owned or held by the Massa-
chusetts Turnpike Authority or on leasehold interests over land owned or held by a
city or town); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 222.01 (West 1972) (permitting the sale or lease of
air rights of any railway company or public utility company); id. § 161.433 (West
Supp. 1983) (permitting commissioner of Highway to lease airspace above a high-
way); id. § 472 A.10 (West 1977) (municipality may sell or lease air rights over
municipal structures); id. § 11-115 A.06 (West Supp. 1983) (airspace may be pur-
chased, leased, granted, and condemned to create buffer area around sites for
hazardous waste facilities); NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-1730 (1977) (granting each metrop-
olis the right to lease airspace above city owned property upon terms not to exceed 99
years); NEv. REV. STAT. § 408.212 (1979) (permitting use of airspace over highways);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 48-B:2 (West 1971) (governing board of municipality may
lease air rights over public streets and way, public parking facilities, land and waters
owned by the municipality, except parks, and for no more than 99 years); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 40-16-03 (Supp. 1981) (promoting municipal development by making
space above, below, and adjacent to parking facilities available for commercial
development); OR. REV. STAT. § 271.430 (1981) (space over streets and highways may
be leased); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 802 (West 1965) (permitting creation of estates
and interests in airspace above the surface of the ground); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
35.22.302 (Supp. 1982) (airspace above real property or structures or improvements
owned by the city may be conveyed or leased for public or private use); id. §
84.36.270 (granting tax relief to owner of real property who has granted to a county
or city the perpetual right to use the airspace above his property for stadium facili-
ties); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.048 (West 1965 & Supp. 1982-1983) (a city or village may
lease or sell space over any street, alley, public place, or municipally owned real
estate).
43. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60 §§ 801, 803 (West Supp. 1982-83) (airspace is real
property owned by the person or persons holding title to the surface land beneath it).
44. Id. § 804. Thus airspace can be acquired, held, possessed, alienated, granted,
sold, conveyed, leased, released, mortgaged, encumbered, zoned, platted and con-
demned in the same manner as other real property subject to the same statutes, rules
of law and common law as other real property. Id. All rights and liabilities which
apply to estates shall apply to airspace. Id. Titles may be created, transferred and
conveyed in airspace, Id. § 805. It can be divided or apportioned in any geometric
shape or pattern. Id. § 807. Interest and title to airspace can be inherited or devised
upon the death of the owner. Id. § 808. Interests, titles, estates, or rights in airspace
can be taxed. Id. § 809. The Act recognizes the rights and privileges associated with
air travel, id. § 804, as do other state statutes N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-03-03 (1975). S.
D. CoMP. ANN. § 50-13-3 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 42-1-103 (1980). This legisla-
tion substantially reproduces all the provisions of the Model Airspace Act. See R.
WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 554-57. The Model Airspace Act is presently being consid-
ered by the New York Law Revision Commission. N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n, Report
of the Law Revision Commission 13 (1982).
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inseparable from the soil, none of these provisions allows airspace to
be constructively transferred from one physical location to another.
C. The Third Phase: Constructive Transfer of Airspace
1. A New Concept of Real Property
It has been suggested that the modern essence of real property is its
potential for profitable use rather than its physical location in space. 45
Thus, if real property could be shifted from one location to another
profitably, its essence would not be violated. 46 Section 12-10 has
enabled such an event to occur. 47 The authorities generally refer to the
transactions which occur under section 12-10 and its counterpart,
sections 74-79 to 74-793,48 as an air right or development right 49
45. Marcus, supra note 13, at 88. Mr. Marcus, General Counsel to the New York
City Planning Commission points out that location in space as the essence of real
property is based on three grounds: (1) that land is valued for the quality of its
surface, (2) that land is the principal source of wealth and stability, (3) that title to
land is based on seisen. Id. at 86-89. Marcus argues that the first of these is a remnant
of medieval society, the second is no longer a foregone conclusion, and the third is a
ceremonious institution long since abandoned in the law. Id.
46. The only conflict would be with the deep-seated feeling that real property is
more than profit-generating property and that its essence is indeed its location in
space. Id. at 103.
47. One § 12-10 transfer resulted in a selling price of five million dollars. Mac-
Millan, Inc. v. Cadillac Fairview Corp., 86 A.D.2d 15, 17, 448 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669
(1st Dep't), rev'd sub nom. MacMillan, Inc. v. CF Lex Assocs., 56 N.Y.2d 386, 437
N.E.2d 1134, 452 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1982).
48. New York City Zoning Resolution §§ 74-79 to 74-793 (1968). The ordinance
gives the owners of landmark sites additional opportunities to constructively transfer
airspace to contiguous lots. Moreover, landmarks can transfer airspace to parcels
across streets and street intersections or to lots "across the street and opposite to
another lot or lots which, except for the intervention of streets or street intersections,
form a series extending to the lot occupied by the landmark building" when all lots
are in common ownership. Id. See Marcus, supra note 4, at 374-75.
A landmark transfer requires a three-step procedure: (1) the owner of the land-
mark must obtain permission from the Landmark Commission who determines
whether a transfer is compatible with the landmark; (2) the City Planning Commis-
sion studies the effects a transfer wouldhave on the occupants of buildings in the
vicinity of the transferee lot and whether or not the landmark owner will preserve the
landmark; and (3) the Board of Estimate is the final arbiter, granting or denying
permission. Costonis, supra note 26, at 585-86. Nevertheless, the airspace transfers in
§ 12-10 and § 74-79 are conceptually the same. See Note, supra note 4, at 348-49.
49. Development rights have been described as "planning shorthand for the
amount of floor area that may be developed on a given lot," note, supra note 4, at
338, and as "unused development potential," Marcus, supra note 4, at 375, or simply
as " development potential," id. at 377-78. Development rights and air rights are
terms which are used interchangeably in the context of transfers. See, e.g., id. at
372-78.
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transfer.50 Beneath this nebulous terminology, 5' however, airspace
itself is being transferred.
2. Unamended 12-10: Disregard of Butler and the Landowner's
Exclusive Ownership of Airspace
The original section 12-1052 permitted a zoning lot merger only if
the contiguous lots were in single ownership. 53 Ownership of a zoning
lot was statutorily defined to include a lease of not less than fifty years
duration with an option to renew such lease so as to provide for a total
lease of not less than seventy-five years duration. 54 In Newport Associ-
ates v. Solow, 55 a fee owner claimed that the transfer of airspace
above his land by such a lessee diminished the value of his reversion-
ary interest.50 Interpreting the resolution literally, the court of appeals
50. The courts generally observe that the transaction under § 12-10 enables a
receiving lot to build a structure containing more space, but they usually refer to the
transaction in terms of air rights or development rights rather than in terms of
airspace. See, e.g., MacMillan, Inc. v. CF Lex Assocs., 56 N.Y.2d 386, 389-70, 437
N.E.2d 1134, 1136, 452 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (1982); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of
New York, 39 N.Y.2d 890, 891, 350 N.E.2d 381, 383, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6, appeal
dismissed, 429 U.S. 587 (1976), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Newport Assocs. v. Solow,
30 N.Y.2d 263, 268, 283 N.E.2d 600, 603, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617, 621 (1972), cert.
denied. 410 U.S. 931 (1973); MacMillan, Inc. v. Cadillac Fairview Corp., 86 A.D.2d
15, 17, 448 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669 (1st Dep't), rev'd sub nom. MacMillan, Inc. v. CF Lex
Assocs., 56 N.Y.2d 386, 437 N.E.2d 1134, 462 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1982); Pith Equities,
Inc. v. New York Theological Seminary, 39 A.D.2d 890, 891, 333 N.Y.S.2d 970, 971
(1st Dep't 1972); Fur-Lex Realty v. Lindsay, 81 Misc. 2d 904, 906, 367 N.Y.S.2d 388,
391 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975). One court referred to the transaction as permitting
an incorporation of unused airspace. Newport Assocs. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 265,
283 N.E.2d 600, 601, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931
(1973). However, there is no mention of the step which would have to precede
incorporation, that is, an airspace transfer; rather the reference is to a transfer of air
development rights. Id. at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 603, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 621 (Breitel, J.,
concurring).
51. One court has characterized development rights as disembodied abstractions
of man's ingenuity. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587,
598, 350 N.E.2d 381, 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 11 (1976), aJJ'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In
essence, the area is being constructively transferred from one site to another. Note,
supra note 4, at 338. The transaction, then, is a spatial transfer. See Marcus, supra
note 13, at 103; City of New York Dep't of City Planning, Midtown Development
Project Draft Report 52 (1980) (illustration of zoning lot merger).
52. New York City Zoning Resolution art. 1, ch. 2, § 12-10 (1961) (amended
1977) [hereinafter cited as § 12-10 unamended].
53. Id. See CPC Doc., supra note 18, at 1.
54. Section 12-10 unamended, supra note 52.
55. 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 931 (1973).
56. Id. at 265-66, 283 N.E.2d at 601, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 619. In that case the lessee
had exercised his status as an owner and transacted an air rights transfer without the
permission of the land owner. Id. at 266, 283 N.E.2d at 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
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held that absent a provision in the lease to the contrary, the defendant
had the power to utilize the air rights above the plaintiff's property. 7
Hence, a constructive transfer of airspace from one lot to another was
facilitated. Consequently, the unamended section 12-10 as interpreted
by the court in Newport Associates conflicted with Butler's holding
that a surface landowner is the sole owner of the superadjacent air-
space,'5 since under Newport Associates, a lessee of the surface could
also own the airspace.59
3. The Amendment of Section 12-10 and Provision for
"Parties in Interest"
The real estate community was displeased with the result in New-
port Associates."° In response, the Commission eliminated the provi-
sion that permitted a lessee of fifty years with an option for a total of
not less than seventy-five years to qualify as an owner of a zoning
lot."' At the same time the Commission realized that certain parties
held property interests in airspace6 2 equivalent to those held in the
land 6 3 which deserved protection. 4 In order to protect these property
rights, the Commission amended section 12-10,6s requiring a declara-
tion of single zoning lot status to be executed by all "parties in inter-
est" whenever air rights are transferred under the Resolution to a
parcel other than one owned by the feeowner of the transferor par-
cel. 88
57. Id. at 267, 283 N.E.2d at 602, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
58. Butler stated that the land owner possessed the airspace exclusively. 186 N.Y.
at 491, 79 N.E. at 718 (1906).
59. As Judge Breitel pointed out in his concurring opinion, either the land owner
or the long term lessee could have acted to the exclusion of the other. It all depended
on who acted first. See Newport Assocs., 30 N.Y.2d at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 603, 332
N.Y.S.2d at 621 (Breitel, J., concurring). Thus, the landowner's right to the airspace
was not totally destroyed. In the absence of exercising his right, however, he would
probably have to reserve in the lease all claims to airspace. Id. at 268-69, 283 N.E.2d
at 603, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 621. In any event, this effectively eliminated the landowner's
Butler claim to exclusive possession.
60. One authority noted that the decision was a shock to the real estate commu-
nity. Rifkin, TDR's are a Growth Industry in Regulation of Land Use, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 18, 1981, at 34, col. 1.
61. CPC Doc., supra note 18, at 2.
62. Id.
63. The Commission gave two examples, mortgagees and lienors. Id.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Amended § 12-10, supra note 1.
66. CPC Doe., supra note 18, at 2. The declaration is made in a written Declara-
tion of Restrictions covering the whole tract of land or in separate written Declara-
tions of Restrictions which cover parts of the tract of the land and which in the
aggregate cover the entire tract of land. Each "party in interest" executes a declara-
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In such a case the resolution provides:
(iv) A "party in interest" in the portion of the tract of land covered
by a Declaration shall include only (W) the fee owner or owners
thereof, (X) the holder of any enforceable recorded interest in all or
part thereof which would be superior to the Declaration and which
could result in such holder obtaining possession of any portion of
such tract of land, (Y) the holder of any enforceable recorded
interest in all or part thereof which would be adversely affected by
the Declaration, and (Z) the holder of any unrecorded interest in
all or part thereof which would be superior to and adversely af-
fected by the Declaration and which would be disclosed by a
physical inspection of the portion of the tract of land covered by the
Declaration .67
The first "party in interest" whose permission would be required for
an air rights transfer to occur is a fee owner. Thus, the Commission
vindicated Butler's holding that the landowner likewise owns the
superadjacent airspace.68 But the Commission provided that there
could be other "parties in interest"69 enjoying a property interest in
the airspace as well. 70 Identification of these parties in interest is
difficult since they are described rather than identified in the Resolu-
tion. 71 The recent New York Court of Appeals decision in MacMillan
v. CF Lex Associates,72 however, has provided a framework to make
these identifications.
4. MacMillan: The Return to Butler
In MacMillan v. Cadillac Fairview Corp. ,7 a long term lessee of a
building claimed that he was a "party in interest" under the resolu-
tion, excepting those who waive their right to make such a declaration in a written
instrument executed by such party in recordable form and recorded at or prior to the
recording of the declaration. Each declaration and waiver of right to execute a
declaration must be recorded in the Conveyances Section of the Office of the City
Register or, if applicable, the County Clerk's Office of the county in which such tract
of land is located, against each lot of record constituting a portion of the land covered
by the declaration. Amended § 12-10, supra note 1, at 60.
67. Amended § 12-10, supra note 1, at 61.
68. That is, at least now airspace could not be" constructively" transferred away
from the landowner's lot without his permission.
69. Amended § 12-10, supra note 1, at 61 (d)(iv).
70. They would enjoy a property interest in the airspace to the extent that they,
too, could prevent constructive transfer of airspace.
71. Amended § 12-10, supra note 1, at 61 (d)(iv).
72. MacMillan, Inc. v. CF Lex Assocs., 56 N.Y.2d 386, 437 N.E.2d 1134, 452
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1982).
73. 86 A.D.2d 15, 448 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1st Dep't), rev'd sub nom. MacMillan, Inc.
v. CF Lex Assocs., 56 N.Y.2d 386, 437 N.E.2d 1134, 452, N.Y.S.2d 377 (1982).
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tion. The lessee occupied the entire rentable area of the building
above the ground floor and ninety-five percent of the usable area as a
whole.7 4
The appellate division determined that the lessee could be a party in
interest under subsection (d)(iv)(x) or (y) of the resolution. 75 The court
placed particular emphasis on the fact that the lessee would be ad-
versely affected by an interference with light and air 7 and by the
congestive effect on community services if a transfer occurred. 77 It
found support for its conclusion in the statement of legislative intent. 78
Although the court limited its holding to the facts of the case,7 9 using
the same rationale, a tenant of far less area plausibly could argue that
he is a "party in interest." Moreover, the decision departs from But-
ler's principle that rights to airspace are derived from rights in the
ground. The decision indicated that even though section 12-10 had
been amended to correct the result achieved in Newport, the influence
of Newport remained.80
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the statute required that
any "party in interest" had to have an interest in the tract of land itself
and that the term "tract of land" referred only to the surface land8'
and not to the buildings thereon. 82 The Court re-established the Butler
principle which declared that rights to airspace are incident to or
74. Id. at 16, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 669.
75. Id. at 19, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
76. Id. at 19, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 670. 12-10 (d)(iv)(Y) states that the holder of any
enforceable recorded interest in all or part of the tract of land which would be
adversely affected by the declaration is a "party in interest." Amended § 12-10, supra
note 1, at 61.
77. MacMillan, Inc. v. Cadillac Fairview Corp., 86 A.D.2d at 19, 448 N.Y.S.2d
at 670.
78. Id. The court isolated one of 11 enumerated general purposes from New York
City Zoning Resolution art. 3, ch. 1, § 31-00 (g) (1977), which stressed the Commis-
sion's concern that the bulk of buildings in relation to the land around them and to
one another should be limited.
79. MacMillan v. Cadillac Fairview Corp., 86 A.D.2d at 20, 448 A.D.2d at 670.
80. Since, under Newport Assocs., a long term lessee who did not have an interest
in the surface land would have been able to effect a transfer, and under MacMillan v.
Cadillac Fairview Corp. a long term lessee without an interest in the surface land
would be able to prevent a transfer.
81. The term "tract of land" was not defined in the resolution. Using Webster's
Third International Dictionary to derive the meaning of the words "tract" and
"land", the court noted that neither alone nor in combination do the words "tract"
and "land" connote, in a lexicographic sense, buildings or improvements. MacMil-
lan, 56 N.Y.2d at 391, 392, 437 N.E.2d at 1137, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
82. Id. at 389, 393, 437 N.E.2d at 1135, 1137, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 378, 380 (citing
Butler, 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906)).
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associated with ownership of the surface property and not with own-
ership of structures thereon.8 3
The decision that "parties in interest" who are not fee owners also
must have an interest in the land itself is an extrapolation from and
complement to Butler. Butler determined that airspace is land. Like
the more traditional surface land, there is at all times an owner of the
airspace. 4 Ownership of surface land is not necessarily absolute,8 5 but
subject to the rights of those who possess a lesser yet recognized
property interest in the airspace. 6 Similarly, ownership of airspace
can be limited by the rights of those who possess a corresponding lesser
but recognized property interest in the airspace.
Butler identified the owner of the airspace by merely looking down-
ward to the owner of the surface land below. By analogy, the court's
reading of section 12-10 in MacMillan identifies those parties who
possess other recognized property interests in the airspace by similarly
looking downward to those who possess other recognized property
interests in the surface land below. Consequently, the MacMillan
decision not only represents a vindication of Butler, it represents a
sophistication of the concepts which Butler stands for.
IV. Parties in Interest
The amended section 12-10 as interpreted by the MacMillan deci-
sion provides guidelines for identifying "parties in interest" under
subdivision (d) of the resolution.
Remaindermen and reversionary interests,8 7 for example, would
qualify under subparagraph (x) as long as their interest had been
83. Id. at 391, 437 N.E.2d at 1137, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
84. With few exceptions everything that exists, whether physically tangible or
not, can be subjected to the ownership of man. W. ROBINSON, ELEMENTARY LAW § 38
(1882).
85. An owner of property may part with many of the powers, privileges, rights,
and immunities that constitute the complete property. 1 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §
10 comment c (1936).
86. For example, the owner of property may mortgage it or have it subjected to a
mechanic's lien. Id. A mortgage represents a security for a loan, and is executed and
delivered by a borrower, subsequently being recorded as a lien on his real estate. It
secures either (1) "money lent at the time" (2) "money to be advanced" or (3)
"money already owing." 3 D. HARVEY & E. BISKIND, HARVEY'S LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY AND TITLE CLOSING § 830 (1982). A lien is "a claim which one person has upon
the property of another as security for some debt or charge," tying that property to
the satisfaction of the debt or claim. United States v. 1364.76875 Wine Gallons, 60 F.
Supp. 389, 392 (E.D. Mo. 1945).
87. A remainder is a future estate voluntarily created in a person other than the
creator, whereas a reversion is created by operation of law and is an interest in an
estate that reverts to a grantor or his heirs after another estate has terminated with no
residue remaining. D. HARVEY & E. BISKIND, supra note 86, at 117. See N.Y. EST.
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recorded prior to the making of declarations of interest,88 since hold-
ing such interest could result in the holder obtaining possession of such
tract of land. 9 A mortgagee or lessee who possesses an option to buy
would likewise fall under this provision as long as it had complied
with the applicable recording statute prior to the declarations, since
they, too, by virtue of their interest could obtain possession 0 of the
tract of land. The holder of the mortgage, a remainderman, a rever-
sioner and a ground lessee, could likewise argue that they would be
adversely affected 9' as contemplated under subsection (y). A lien-
holder9 2 with a recorded interest could make a similar argument.
However, since the resolution does not define the term "adversely
affected" and the term was not construed in MacMillan, the courts
will be the final arbiter of what interests are capable of being "ad-
versely affected." Subsection (z) applies to unrecorded interests and it
exacts the strictest criteria. Not only must the interest be prior to and
adversely affected, the adverse effect must be disclosed by a physical
inspection of the portion of the tract of land covered by the Declara-
tion.9 3 This added element, "disclosure by physical inspection," was
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 6-4.3 to 6-4.4 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1982-1983). A
future estate is "an estate limited to commence in possession at a future time, either
without the intervention of a precedent estate or on the determination by lapse of
time or otherwise, of a precedent estate created at the same time. Id. § 6-4.2.
88. The recording must occur prior to the declaration. Section 12-10, supra note
1, at 61 (iv)(x).
89. This section of the resolution merely requires that the party could obtain
possession of a portion of the tract of land as opposed to necessarily obtaining
possession. Amended § 12-10, supra note 1, at 61 (iv)(x).
90. A mortgagee on income producing property usually enjoys the express right
of entering into possession of the property in the event of a default. D. HARVEY & E.
BISKIND, supra note 84, at § 897. Upon exercising his option to buy the land a lessee
would also come into possession, and ownership connotes the right to possession,
present and future. 1 H. TIFFANY & B. JONES, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2 (3d ed.
1939).
91. The Commission, in indicating that a mortgagee would be a "party in
interest," referred to a mortgagee's unwillingness to have his security diminished.
CPC Doc., supra note 18, at 2. A remainderman or reversioner could similarly argue
that an air rights transfer would adversely affect their estate by reducing its value. In
a ground lease, a lessor conveys land to a lessee who undertakes to develop the
property through new construction or substantial improvements. Hecht, Variable
Rental Provisions in Long Term Ground Leases, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 625, 626 (1972).
The lessor receives a stipulated annual rent and the lessee's rental costs are tax
deductible. The size and scope of the construction significantly affects the measure of
the lessee's return. Id. at 636. If the airspace were transferred, the lessee's construc-
tion would be limited. This, in turn, would affect the measure of his return. Argua-
bly, this would amount to an adverse effect.
92. See note 86 supra for definition of a lien.
93. Amended § 12-10, supra note 1, at 61 (iv)(z).
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also not defined in the resolution. Therefore, identification of those
who would fit this category would be highly speculative.94
V. Conclusion
Butler declared that airspace is land inseparable from the soil,
which is owned by the subadjacent landowner. Just as a tract of
surface land may be separated into two tracts, permitting one subtract
to be conveyed while the other is retained, airspace may be separated
from the land beneath it, permitting its separate conveyance. The
Oklahoma Airspace Act attempts to perfect the status of airspace as
94. One authority, however, has suggested that at the very least a holder of a
visible physical prescriptive easement in the parcel to be improved would be a "party
in interest" under the resolution. Rifkin, supra note 60, at 34, col. 2. A prescriptive
easement is one which comes into being when a party adversely, openly and notori-
ously, continuously and uninterruptedly uses the land of another for a statutory
period of time. Beutler v. Maynard, 80 A.D.2d 982, 983, 437 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (4th
Dep't 1981). If it can be shown that the use is open and notorious, continued and
uninterrupted for the required time, it is presumed adverse. Id., 437 N.Y.S.2d at 465
(prescriptive use not established since plaintiff failed to establish that he had used
cabin continuously).
In the final analysis, now that it has been determined that the rights in airspace are
derived from rights in the surface, the openness of these categories is probably better
suited to the purpose of protecting all property interests in the airspace than outright
identification would have been since it prevents the exclusion by oversight of parties
whose interests would be undeniable if they could be foreseen, while still permitting
the court to apply the equivalent terrestrial interest to airspace. In contrast to
"parties in interest" under (d) of amended § 12-10 is the term "parties in interest"
under I (c). The differences between the two uses of the term in the resolution can be
observed by comparing the different provisions covering the term "zoning lot."
Paragraph (a) of the amended § 12-10 covers the situation of an existing zoning lot of
record. Paragraph (b) covers those tracts of land which are in single ownership so
that every interest in the complete tract is in the hands of the owner. Amended § 12-
10, supra note 1, at 60 11 (a) & (b). Neither situation involves "parties in interest."
Paragraphs (c) & (d) cover the remaining situations. Under I (c) the tracts of land are
merely under single fee ownership with respect to which there are "parties in inter-
est" whose interest is in all or substantially all of the complete tract. Id. at 60-61 1 (c),
(c)(ii). Since a party in interest under this subsection has an interest in both the
granting and the receiving lot, the transfer of the air rights from one parcel to
another does not result in a reduction of his interest therein. No declaration is
required under this subsection. Id. at 60 1 (c). In contrast to I (c), (d) covers
situations where the "party in interest" has an interest in one parcel or the other.
Amended § 12-10, supra note 1, at 61 1 (d)(iv). See Marcus, The New Zoning Lot
Definition, 6 REAL ESTATE L.J. 336, 338 (1978); Letter from John C. Nelson, Chair-
man, Committee on Real Property Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York to New
York City Planning Commission 5 (October 14, 1976).
Since a "party in interest" who did not have an interest in the receiving lot would
suffer a dimunition to his interest by an air rights transfer, he is required to make a
declaration before such a transfer can be effective. CPC Doc., supra note 18, at 2-3.
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land.9 5 Traditionally, land has been considered stationary property.
Under section 12-10, airspace can be constructively transferred from
one parcel to another. At the same time, however, the amended
section 12-10 as interpreted by MacMillan ensures that a surface
landowner retains 6 his claim to the airspace, a claim which had been
jeopardized by Newport under the unamended section 12-10. More-
over, section 12-10 and MacMillan have refined the Butler concept.
Butler looked to the landowner to identify the owner of the superadja-
cent airspace. Section 12-10 and MacMillan look to those with lesser
but recognized interests in the land to identify those who have the
corresponding interests in the airspace for purposes of the statute. This
in turn has provided a proper and predictable framework for identify-
ing who "parties in interest" are under the resolution. Thus two
significant events have occurred. The law of real property has been
liberated by airspace in the sense that real property's physical location
in space is no longer its essence. At the same time, airspace has been
made to conform to the traditions of real property in the sense that
airspace is subject to property interest in the same manner as its
terrestrial parent.
In conclusion, although section 12-10 seemingly represents a radical
departure from traditional real property law, MacMillan illustrates
that section 12-10 is actually the best tradition of the law since it both
releases society from principles which are archaic and reasserts the
commitment of society to principles which are timeless.
Terence Kennedy
95. The Oklahoma Airspace Act is a virtual reproduction of The Model Airspace
Act. See note 44 supra.
96. Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906).
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